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Development Trajectories: An Evolutionary Approach to
Integrating Governance and Growth
Brian Levy
Over the past two decades, governance has moved from the
fringes to the center of the development discourse. There is
broad consensus that a well-performing economy rests on a
foundation of good governance, including transparent and
predictable decision making and implementation; oversight
mechanisms that guard against arbitrariness and ensure ac-
countability in how resources are used; public officials com-
mitted to the achievement of social goals, including the
efficient provision of public services; a political process that
is broadly viewed as legitimate; and the protection of prop-
erty rights. 
This depiction has translated, seemingly naturally, into a
“best-practices” recipe for governance reform. The difficulty,
though, is that, given country-specific realities, best-practices
thinking—which works backward from a desired end state—
is at best moderately helpful in identifying feasible next
steps. This note suggests an alternative, evolutionary ap-
proach. Evolution being adaptive from a specific point of
departure, many of the details of an evolutionary approach
necessarily are country specific. Even so, there are some un-
derlying patterns. 
This note, which builds on a longer paper jointly written
by the current author and Francis Fukuyama (Levy and
Fukuyama 2010), delineates two especially prevalent trajec-
tories. The trajectories are very different from one another,
with different underlying drivers, different constraints and
risks, and different frontier challenges. Neither is “better” in
some absolute sense; rather, each is likely to be a better fit
with some country circumstances than with others. But the
two trajectories differ sharply in their implications for pri-
oritizing and sequencing both economic and governance re-
forms. Assessing which aligns better with a country’s specific
This note introduces an evolutionary approach to economic and governance reform. It lays out two especially
prevalent trajectories that differ starkly from one another in how they prioritize and sequence economic growth, state
building, and the development of civil society and political institutions. The first trajectory focuses initially on
investments in state capacity. The second initially prioritizes smaller, more catalytic entry points and addresses specific
capacity and institutional constraints as and when they become binding. Over the longer term, both trajectories
endogenously generate incentives to strengthen institutions that underpin economic competition and political
accountability. But over the short to medium term, the strengths of one trajectory are mirrored as the weakness of the
other. For many low-income countries, the combination of rapid growth plus a seeming excess of either order or chaos
may thus be in the (medium-term) nature of things, rather than an aberration that requires fixing.circumstances thus can have profound implications for de-
velopment strategy. 
Two T rajectories
Empirical research has documented a myriad of causal rela-
tionships that connect the different dimensions of develop-
ment—economic, political, institutional, and social. These
interconnections create an opportunity for thinking strate-
gically, for prioritizing and sequencing, for seeking to do first
that which is necessary or helpful to achieve later goals that
can help initiate or sustain a virtuous spiral of cumulative
change. This implies assessing binding constraints—both
economic and governance constraints—that prevent the
achievement of development goals; and considering alterna-
tive pathways, given both country-specific realities and the
interconnections among the different dimensions. Though
the details are country specific, two trajectories seem espe-
cially prevalent. 
Each of the trajectories is driven by interactions among
the following four sets of variables:
• economic growth, defined as increases in per capita
GDP, noting that variations in the inclusiveness of that
growth can be relevant for the longer-term sustainabil-
ity of a country’s development path;
• state building, which includes (1) defining territorial
reach and extending enforcement power over that ter-
ritory; and (2) creating public bureaucracies capable
of extracting taxes, budgeting and spending money,
and enforcing the state’s rules;
• civil society and private sector development, defined
broadly to describe the transition from ascriptive, in-
herited social relationships and a limited division of
labor in the economy to more fluid and accessible hi-
erarchies, with social groups able to freely organize on
the basis of shared passions and interests and with pri-
vate firms becoming more complex organizations that
operate at arm’s length from politics; and
• development of political institutions, including (1) the
emergence of rule-of-law institutions that reduce the
state’s discretionary use of force and provide the basis
for the protection of a private sphere and individual
human rights; and (2) popular sovereignty via institu-
tional arrangements, such as elections, separated pow-
ers, and a media and civil society outside of the formal
political system that can monitor and check govern-
ment’s performance.
How actions across these four sets of variables are prioritized
and sequenced differs starkly between the two trajectories. 
Trajectory I: State Capacity Building
When a low-income country is not growing, some of the
proximate reasons can be plainly visible. Government and
politics don’t work. The risks to private investors and entre-
preneurs—of failed infrastructure, of a dysfunctional and bur-
densome bureaucracy, of political pressures to “share” profits,
of violence and instability—generally overwhelm any entre-
preneurial instinct to seek opportunities for productive in-
vestment. In environments such as these, a natural response
is to look for “political will”—for leadership ready to build
state capacity that responds to the public interest rather than
to private ends, improves policy making and implementation,
makes wise public investments, and puts in place an environ-
ment capable of attracting private investment. 
Figure 1 depicts how leadership along these lines could
set in motion a virtuous development spiral. The first step
is an investment in state capacity building. In the second
step, this newly built capacity helps facilitate economic
growth, via three complementary channels:
• Channel 2a highlights the direct links between im-
provements in state performance and economic per-
formance. Better policies, more efficient infrastructure,
a transactionally more efficient bureaucracy, transpar-
ent and participatory approaches to service provi-
sion—all of these can contribute to a better investment
climate, and thus potentially to growth. Improving in-
frastructure and the bureaucracy takes time, with little
opportunity for quick wins; policy, however, can be
turned around quite rapidly.
• Channel 2b highlights the expectations-driven impact
of the emergence of leadership perceived to have the
political will to build state capacity. Even before public
sector performance actually improves, belief in the
productive potential of the economy can rise among
private investors—with the credibility gain itself some-
times sufficient to achieve renewed economic activity
and accelerated growth. (One common way to secure
such credibility has been to rapidly adopt far-reaching
“stroke-of-the-pen” economic reforms.)
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Source: Author’s illustration.• As channel 2c of figure 1 suggests, political leaders can
make the capacity and credibility channels mutually
reinforcing by asserting a broader commitment to
“fairness”—to inclusive growth with broadly shared
benefits. Insofar as citizens believe this commitment,
both state legitimacy and stability will be enhanced,
contributing more broadly to improvements in the in-
vestment climate and hence to growth.
Note that none of these channels involves political institu-
tions. The route from state capacity building to transforma-
tion of political institutions is a long-term and indirect one,
with social change (perhaps via wealth creation, the rise of
a middle class, and participatory approaches to service pro-
vision) generating new pressures for the rule of law to man-
age inter-elite conflicts (both among firms and between
businesses and the state) and for political reform more
broadly. Step 3, the dotted line in figure 1 illustrates this
longer-term dynamic.
Readers familiar with the development literature will rec-
ognize the sequence described above as that of the “devel-
opmental state.” The past 50 years offer no shortage of
countries and political leaders that have put themselves for-
ward as aspirant developmental states. It was the dominant
model underlying East Asian development. It was an aspira-
tion of many Latin American countries (including Brazil and
Mexico) prior to the 1980s. The former centrally planned
economies offered a (failed) radical variant for much of the
20th century. Contemporary examples range from Ethiopia,
Rwanda, and Uganda in Africa, to Azerbaijan in Central Asia
and Vietnam in Southeast Asia. In each of these cases, gov-
ernments combine efforts to win legitimacy by highlighting
the competence of their rule, on the one hand, with a con-
tinuing wariness of greater political participation and ac-
countability, on the other. Each has achieved quite strong
economic performance (relative to its peers, and/or its pre-
ceding historical experience). 
A few developmental states have been spectacularly suc-
cessful, with the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, China, two
classic examples. In both economies, development was led by
interventionist, competent states that used proactive indus-
trial policies to fuel growth. In both, the initial decades of ac-
celerated development were under authoritarian rule—but
“fairness” provided a basis of legitimacy in each case. Land re-
forms ensured rural equity; growth was oriented toward labor-
intensive exports and was employment creating; high public
investment in education provided opportunity for all. And, in
both economies, inclusive growth set in motion profound so-
cial transformation—facilitating the emergence of a middle
class and an eventual transition to democracy. However, for
reasons that will be explored later in this note, sustained suc-
cess in traversing the state capacity-building trajectory re-
mains more the exception than the rule.
Trajectory II: “Just Enough” Governance
Underlying the state capacity building is the presumption
that institutional reform is necessary to unlock development
in hitherto poorly performing countries. In sharp contrast,
recent empirical work on “growth accelerations” has demon-
strated that far-reaching reforms—either institutional or eco-
nomic—are not necessary to kick-start growth. Looking at
worldwide  data  over  the  1950–90  period,  Hausmann,
Pritchett, and Rodrik’s (2004) careful empirical analysis
identified more than 80 growth accelerations that lasted for
eight or more years . Rodrik (2007) highlights some of the
key implications: 
Countries do not need an extensive set of institu-
tional reforms in order to start growing. Instigating
growth is a lot easier in practice than the standard
recipe....When a country is far below its potential...
even moderate movements in the right direction can
produce a big growth payoff.... (p. 39)
The onset of economic growth does not require
deep and extensive institutional reform....Moderate
changes in country-specific circumstances (policies and
institutional arrangements, often interacting with the
external environment),...can produce discontinuous
changes in economic performance....Once growth is
set into motion, it becomes easier to maintain a virtuous
cycle, with high growth and institutional transforma-
tion feeding on each other. (pp. 190–91)
Consistent with this pattern, figure 2 delineates a second
development trajectory—one in which the first step is the
initiation of growth itself.
Steps 2a–2c in figure 2 illustrate how a just-enough-
governance virtuous cycle might evolve incrementally. All of
these steps are depicted by dotted lines, here intended to sig-
nify that sustaining growth in a strategy of just enough gov-
ernance remains the primary objective. As growth proceeds,
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Source: Author’s illustration.though, one or another institutional constraint may threaten
to short-circuit expansion—perhaps weaknesses in the deliv-
ery of infrastructure or key public services, perhaps a rise in
corruption as public officials seek their share of the growing
economic pie, perhaps rising social alienation with a growing
sense on the part of citizens that government doesn’t care
about their everyday problems, perhaps the need for more
sophisticated laws and institutions to underpin an increas-
ingly sophisticated economy. With a just-enough-governance
strategy, the goal is not to anticipate and address in advance
all possible institutional constraints. Rather, the focus is on
addressing specific capacity and institutional constraints as
and when they become binding. Hausmann, Rodrik, and Ve-
lasco (2006) provide a heuristic framework for distinguishing
among alternative binding constraints.
Sustaining growth thus becomes something of a “high-
wire act”—continually managing crises and putting out fires
in an environment that the casual observer would consider
quite dysfunctional, but one that nonetheless defies the odds
by sustaining continuing dynamism. 
Bangladesh offers a vivid example of the relevance of a
just-enough-governance development strategy. Over the
past decade, Bangladesh has made major gains in develop-
ment performance. In the three decades following the coun-
try’s independence in the early 1970s, per capita income
more than doubled; the poverty rate fell from 70 percent to
40 percent; child immunization rates rose from negligible
levels to close to 80 percent; life expectancy at birth went
from 45 years to 63 years. But over the same period, the
country rated consistently among the most corrupt countries
in the world; other governance indicators also rated poorly.
Key to Bangladesh’s paradoxical achievement were a series
of just-enough development reforms: good macroeconomic
management, targeted trade policy reforms that provided
just enough openness to enable the garment export sector
to take off (and similarly focused policies that facilitated
rapid expansion in aquaculture, the introduction of a winter
rice  crop,  and  remittances  from  Bangladeshis  working
abroad)—plus an unusually strong role for the country’s
well-developed nongovernmental institutions in the provi-
sion of public services. This strong overall performance has
occurred against the backdrop of continuing crisis—includ-
ing, between 2006 and 2010, a chaotic lead-in to a presiden-
tial election, subsequently aborted by a de facto military
coup; legal action against the country’s two leading politi-
cians on suspicion of corruption; and a new round of elec-
tions  (with  the  established  leaders  again  leading  their
parties). Throughout this upheaval, growth has continued.
Other countries that have moved along the just-enough-
governance trajectory—and currently are at very different
stages in the journey—include Albania, Costa Rica, India,
Mauritius, Thailand, and Zambia.
Note that the just-enough-governance sequence should
not be construed as a relatively painless (if nerve-racking)
development strategy. For one thing, there are many coun-
tries where the economic environment is too dysfunctional
and institutions are too weak for incremental reforms to be
enough to kick-start growth. And not all binding constraints
can be eased through incremental measures. Over the longer
term, a complex economy requires complex institutions; so,
at some point, the longer-term constraints must be ad-
dressed. At some point, channel 3 (identical in figures 1 and
2) is likely to become dominant, setting the stage for a non-
incremental transformation of political institutions. 
Even so, at least in some circumstances (those where the
underlying growth drivers are strong and/or capacity and in-
stitutional constraints are not overwhelmingly constraining),
just enough governance would appear to be a viable short-
term development strategy. Moreover, as figure 2 suggests, the
longer a just-enough-governance strategy can be sustained,
the broader is the likely constituency with a stake in stronger
institutions, and hence the better may be the prospects for in-
stitutional reform proceeding in a cumulative fashion. 
Sequences and Structures
The two trajectories should not be viewed as a pair of tech-
nocratic alternatives between which putative reformers in
low-income countries are free to choose. On the contrary,
choice is path dependent to a significant extent, with coun-
try-specific history and politics limiting the scope for ma-
neuvering  and  shaping  the  trajectory  of  change.  An
influential book (Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual
Framework  for  Interpreting  Recorded  Human  History by
North, Wallis, and Weingast [2009]) and related work by
Khan (2010) suggest what might be the key variables that
shape and constrain this choice. They highlight the central
role of political stability as a platform for economic devel-
opment. North, Wallis, and Weingast focus on the organiza-
tion of “elite bargains” as key to securing stability. Khan
frames the key variable more broadly in terms of the “polit-
ical settlement.” 
Consistent with these contributions, the first row of table
1 distinguishes between two modes of organizing the elite
bargain:
1. a bargain organized around a dominant political party
(or dominant individual), with clear boundaries be-
tween elites who are incorporated into the dominant
structure and outsiders; or 
2. a  bargain  underpinned  by  competition,  where  the
boundary between political insiders and outsiders is
more blurred—with a realistic prospect among outsiders
that they could become part of an insider coalition. 
As Levy (2010) illustrates in a comparative assessment of
Mozambique and Zambia, considering together the structure
of the elite bargain and the two trajectories outlined in figures
4 POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT (PREM) NETWORK www.worldbank.org/economicpremise1 and 2 suggests the possibility of two underlying (and possi-
bly quite ubiquitous) clusters. First, consider country settings
where elite authority has converged around a dominant leader
or dominant party. In such settings, even if public institutions
remain relatively weak, coordination among insider elites is
relatively straightforward. This ability to coordinate provides
both the incentives and opportunities for fostering develop-
ment through the state capacity-building trajectory: strength-
ening state capability can enhance the ability of this dominant
grouping to achieve its objectives, whatever they may be.
Thus, as table 1 signals, one plausibly ubiquitous cluster com-
prises a “dominant” elite bargain, coordinated decision mak-
ing, and state capacity development—that is, (dominant) state
capacity development (D-STATCAP). 
In the second hypothesized cluster, the elite bargain is un-
derpinned by an agreement that elite groupings will com-
pete periodically for power through competitive elections.
Where public institutions already are strong—that is, gener-
ally in middle- and high-income countries—electoral com-
petition  can  credibly  be  organized  around  competing
“programmatic” visions for public action. But where formal
public institutions are weak—as is the norm in most low-in-
come countries—governing elites generally rule by discre-
tion. In such settings, in return for continuing support, elites
can more credibly promise to direct public resources as pri-
vate goods to favored clients than to commit to govern for
the public good (Keefer and Khemani 2005). The recent
country examples of Albania, Bangladesh, and Zambia and
the historical example of Mexico (Haber, Razo, and Maurer
2003) demonstrate that this combination of competition
and  clientelism  can  provide  the  credible  commitments
needed to attract private investment. But as table 1 indicates,
the implied trajectory of change is the high-wire act of com-
petitive just enough governance (C-JEG).
The Governance Knife-edge: Frontier
Challenges and Risks
Framing the governance-development nexus in terms of two
(heuristic) trajectories that contrast sharply with one another
provides an orienting framework to help identify and address
priority, country-specific governance challenges. It does so in
two ways. First, as highlighted by North, Wallis, and Weingast
(2009), the notion of trajectory signals the importance of
clarifying whether a country is at the early, middle, or later
stage in its development of sophisticated institutions and or-
ganizations. Second, clarifying which of the two trajectories
better aligns with a country’s circumstances can offer impor-
tant pointers for the priority reform agenda. 
Frontier Challenges and Risks
At the most aggregate level, the challenges and risks associ-
ated with the two trajectories are similar:
• The frontier challenge for both trajectories is to con-
tinue moving forward—to identify binding economic
or governance-related constraints to continuing posi-
tive evolution, and to find ways to alleviate them. 
• The common risk is going backward, falling off the
knife-edge of development progress. It concerns insti-
tutional decay, a diminution of collective action and a
rise of opportunism; rising conflict; a progressive loss
of the platform of stability. From this risk perspective,
the priority governance task is to identify where might
be the highest risks of reversal (these generally will be
governance related), and how they can be forestalled. 
But the details of these challenges and risks vary starkly across
the two trajectories and within a given trajectory over time.
Consider first D-STATCAP. Embedded in the claim to
power of D-STATCAP’s dominant leadership is an implicit
commitment to excluded groups (elite and nonelite) that
decision making will be guided by a long-run view of the
broader interest. Continued investment in public adminis-
trative capability is thus likely to be consistent with the D-
STATCAP logic. However, the accountability relationships
that underpin that commitment are (at best) limited to
checks and balances within the dominant party. Therein lie
both the risks and the frontier challenge. 
The risks are that a D-STATCAP vision becomes increas-
ingly chimerical. This can happen in several ways:
• An exclusive dominant party might increasingly focus
only on its own narrowest interests (as arguably hap-
pened in Zimbabwe).
• Within-party accountability might weaken, and lead-
ership might become increasingly personalized (as in,
say, Uganda).
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Table 1. Governance Structures and Development Trajectories: A
Mapping 
State capacity- Just-enough-
building trajectory governance trajectory
Structural features:
• How the elite bargain  Dominant leader  Competitive
• is organized or party
• Mode of government  Coordinated Clientelistic
• decision making
Risks and challenges:
• Principal governance  Dominance becomes Institutional decay
• risks increasingly predatory
• Frontier governance  How to evolve toward How to strengthen
• challenges more competitive capacity of state
polity and economy institutions
Country examples Ethiopia, Republic of  Albania, Bangladesh,
Korea, Mozambique,  Costa Rica, India,
Tunisia, Uganda,  Kenya, Mauritius,
Vietnam Zambia• Personalized leadership might become increasingly
self-seeking and predatory. 
• From the outset, a seeming commitment to “develop-
mentalism”  and  associated  state  capacity  building
might be a useful cover for the perpetuation of long-
standing patterns of corrupt, patrimonial rule. The
rhetoric has the virtue of being long on ambitious and
fine-sounding objectives, but so soft and supposedly
long term in its impact that busy work can proceed for
extended periods of time before it becomes evident
that nothing much is being achieved. (Examples over
the past few decades are offered by Marcos in the
Philippines, Mobutu in Zaire, and Moi in Kenya.)
Within the logic of the D-STATCAP trajectory, some
workable mechanisms for mitigating these risks of reversal
and sustaining a programmatic, developmental orientation
are (for insiders) to continue to press for intraparty account-
ability and (for donors also) to help nurture citizen knowl-
edge  and  expectations  of  effective  and  efficient  public
services provision by government. 
Insofar as the risks of reversal are managed effectively and
D-STATCAP successfully supports rapid economic growth,
the frontier challenge is to help build institutions capable of
supporting both an increasingly sophisticated economy and
a wealthier, more empowered citizenry. In the earlier stages
of development, as figure 1 suggests, credible commitment
plus administrative capability alone can be sufficient to en-
sure continuing forward movement along the D-STATCAP
trajectory. With success, though, pressure will rise for invest-
ment in institutions capable of supporting enhanced eco-
nomic and political competition. But these institutions both
reduce the discretion and progressively challenge the lead-
ership of the dominant elite, and so are less incentive com-
patible with D-STATCAP than is public administrative
reform. 
Korea and Taiwan, China, offer examples of a seemingly
successful later-stage D-STATCAP catch-up of institutions of
accountability and competition; but other trajectories also are
feasible. Singapore, for example, generally has been included
with Korea and Taiwan, China, as an example of East Asian
success—but (unlike the latter two economies), for all of its
contemporary economic prowess, Singapore shows no sign of
making a transition to democracy. Alternatively, as Indonesia’s
difficult political evolution over the past decade illustrates,
the transition to greater openness can be an unusually fraught
affair proceeding against the backdrop of an earlier lack of in-
vestment in political institutions and associated underdevel-
opment  of  the  social  expectations  that  support  such
institutions. How this process will play out for China is one
of the key global imponderables for the coming decades.
For the C-JEG trajectory, the process of identifying and
alleviating binding constraints is likely to be far less deliber-
ate than for D-STATCAP. C-JEG’s combination of contend-
ing elite groups and weak formal institutions generally pro-
duces a fraught environment, seemingly teetering on the
edge of chaos. By definition, no single group of actors is
hegemonic; decision making continually is contested; and
narrowly oriented interest seeking (including, at the limit,
individual corruption) is ubiquitous. Conflict continually
threatens to spiral out of control, with an ever-present risk
that fragile institutional gains will be reversed. In this setting,
economic growth—and the shared incentive it generates
among competing elites for continuing forward momen-
tum—is the primary counterweight to the risk of reversal.
Addressing the frontier challenge of strengthening insti-
tutions is likely to be difficult along the C-JEG trajectory.
Short of discontinuous political change (on which more is
presented below), C-JEG settings do not provide strong in-
centives for elites to invest in far-reaching improvements in
either administrative capability or checks-and-balances insti-
tutions. Rather, entry points for institutional improvement
along the C-JEG trajectory are more likely to be incremen-
tal—focused on very specific entry points where collabora-
tion among powerful elite groups can offer evident win-wins.
Though (again) the details must be country and time specific,
examples of the kinds of initiatives with the potential for
traction in “hothouse” C-JEG settings include the following:
export processing zones that incorporate streamlined cus-
toms administration, high-performing central banks, public
health campaigns to limit the spread of infectious disease, in-
frastructural improvements that offer gains to businesses and
middle-class residents (with perhaps some spillover to poorer
neighborhoods), and streamlined arrangements for impar-
tially resolving disputes among private parties. Initiatives such
as these can help begin to build a track record that demon-
strates the gains from collaboration rather than conflict. Cru-
cially, they also can help sustain the forward momentum of
inclusive, labor-demanding economic growth. As long as that
momentum is sustained, deeper currents will continue to be
at work reshaping interests, incentives, and alliances—and
building a groundswell for further rounds of institutional im-
provement over time. 
Hybrids, Resets, and Zig-zags
The D-STATCAP and C-JEG trajectories are conceptual
constructs—”ideal types” used to bring analytical order to
messy, multifaceted reality. The aim is to highlight some key
common features across multiple country-level processes,
not to suggest that these features capture the whole of a
country’s development evolution. In practice, a country’s
governance arrangement could be a hybrid combination of
the two: a competitive system where one party wins a large,
sustained mandate and de facto governs as a dominant party;
a system where a dominant party becomes increasingly per-
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inant party system that gradually expands the space for po-
litical competition. 
Nor  need  a  country  remain  on  the  same  trajectory
throughout the course of its development. “Resets” become
relevant in settings where incremental efforts to sustain a tra-
jectory’s momentum—working “with the grain” of the tra-
jectory’s logic to ease binding economic and governance
constraints and guard against governance reversals—fail to be
effective. In such settings, more fundamental political trans-
formations are likely to be needed to unlock developmental
dynamism. For much of the 20th century, these political re-
sets took the form of organized revolutionary movements or
military coups. Over the past quarter century, the ubiquitous
reset has been provided via democratic elections.
In the first wave of enthusiasm, democratic transitions
were accompanied by high expectations that well-function-
ing institutions could be put in place rapidly and that open
markets  and  competing,  programmatic  political  parties
could quickly become the norm. In practice, as Carothers
(2002) documents, the far more common result was one of
two more ambiguous patterns:
• “Dominant-power  politics”...countries  have
limited but still real political space, some contes-
tation by opposition groups, and most of the
basic institutional forms of democracy. Yet one
political grouping dominates the system in such
a way that there appears to be little prospect of
alternation of power. (p. 10)
• “Feckless pluralism”...countries enjoy alterna-
tion of power between genuinely different group-
ings...but the alternation of power seems only
to trade the country’s problems back and forth
from one hapless side to the other. (pp. 11–12) 
Certainly, these results fell far short of initial, ambitious
hopes. But, contrary to Carothers’ pessimistic depiction, the
trajectories framework suggests that it is too negative to de-
scribe the results as dysfunctional. 
Insofar as the political reset results in the de facto domi-
nance of political actors who perceive themselves to enjoy
stable  incumbency  and  take  a  long-term  view—that  is,
Carothers’ dominant power politics variant—the result ap-
proximates quite closely the D-STATCAP trajectory. And
insofar as the democratic and civil society transformations
are more turbulent—that is, look more like feckless plural-
ism—they might nonetheless unlock a dysfunctional equi-
librium. This  could  help  unleash  quite  rapid  economic
growth, with the resulting chaotic dynamism very closely
resembling the C-JEG trajectory. 
The discussion above suggests the following final specu-
lation. Perhaps everywhere—in the historical experience of
contemporary Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development  countries  and,  more  recently,  for  today’s
emerging economies—the development path is a profoundly
discomfiting one. The strengths of one trajectory are mir -
rored as the weakness of the other: D-STATCAP is top-
down, tightly controlled, and exceedingly orderly (insofar as
it is implemented effectively). C-JEG is haphazard and
seemingly chaotic—but also can be a “good enough” plat-
form for accelerated economic growth and incremental im-
provements in governance. Perhaps, for countries moving
along the path of development, economic growth combined
with a seeming excess of order or a seeming excess of
chaos—or even a zig-zag, back-and-forth motion between
the two—may be in the (medium-term) nature of things
rather than an aberration that requires “fixing.” 
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